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ABSTRACT
Fake malware opcodes generation using HMM and different GAN algorithms
by Harshit Trehan
Malware, or malicious software, is a program that is intended to harm systems.
In the past decade, the number of malware attacks have grown and, more importantly,
evolved. Many researchers have successfully integrated cutting edge Machine Learning
techniques to combat this ever present and growing threat to cyber and information
security. One big challenge faced by many researchers is the lack of enough data
to train machine learning models and specifically deep neural networks properly.
Generative modelling has proven to be very efficient at generating synthesized data
that can match the actual data distribution.
In this project, we aim to generate malware samples as opcode sequences and
attempt to differentiate between the fake and real samples. We use different Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) algorithms and Hidden Markov Models (HMM) to
generate fake samples.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malicious software, or Malware in short, is a software that is specifically designed
to harm computer systems by affecting devices, tampering with/stealing data and even
harming people. Thus, protection of computer systems from malware is an integral
component of information security and malware research plays an important role in
securing computer systems.
Due to the exponential increase in the number of technological devices such as
smart phones, laptops, tablets and many other devices encapsulated by ‘‘Internet of
Things (IoT)’’, the number of malware attacks has grown rapidly. According to data
collected by SonicWall, there were a total of 9.9 billion [1] malware attacks worldwide
in 2019 alone.
Traditional malware classification and detection techniques can be broadly divided
into 3 categories: behavior/anomaly-based detection, signature-based detection and
heuristics-based detection [2].
In anomaly-based techniques, a detector requires prior knowledge of what ‘‘nor-
mal’’ behavior should be and uses that knowledge to decide whether the program being
inspected is harmful or not. This involves 2 phases: training phase and monitoring
phase. In the training/learning phase, the detector learns the system’s healthy/normal
behavior. In the monitoring phase, the detector flags programs that alter the behavior
of the system. One big drawback of these techniques is the alarmingly high false
positive rate [3].
In signature-based techniques, the detector is required to know the signature of a
malicious program and can decide whether the current program is malicious or not [2]
based on its signature. The signature is extracted from a set of contiguous bytes in
the program. On identifying the signature as malware, the signature is stored in a
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database. Although most commercial anti-viruses still use signature-based malware
detection techniques, they have a major drawback that they can only identify known
malware. This means that ‘‘zero-day’’ malware, which haven’t been identified yet are
very hard to catch.
In heuristics-based techniques, the suspected malicious file is either executed in
a virtual environment and the set of instructions is observed (dynamic analysis) or
decompiled before executing it and the code is examined (static analysis) [4]. Heuristics
based analysis can help discover some zero-day attacks but their drawback is that
they are unable to detect malware that use different or newer techniques to harm
systems.
To combat these disadvantages, machine learning techniques have been researched
and developed. During dynamic and static analysis of malicious files, features such
as opcode sequences, API calls, bytes vectors and many other [5, 6, 7] are extracted.
Machine Learning models are trained on these features and tested against potential
malware files.
Although machine learning techniques have shown promising results, there are
still some challenges to this technique. In recent years, malware authors have evolved
even more and developed methods that make malware detection even harder even
for machine learning based techniques. Methods such as malware obfuscation [8] in
which the code of a malicious file is convoluted with dead code and some random
code is inserted from benign files makes it hard to detect a particular file as malicious.
Some other challenges to machine learning based techniques include the availability,
or lack there of, of large public datasets for research purposes [9] and new techniques
employed by malware authors such as Adversarial machine learning [10] to throw off
machine learning models.
In this project, we use mnemonic opcodes extracted from malware executables
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belonging to 5 different malware families. We focus on generating realistic fake malware
samples by solving Problem 2 of Hidden Markov Models (HMM) (see Chapter 2) and
thereby estimating the hidden states to get the opcodes sequence. In addition to using
HMM to generate opcode sequence, we use Generative Adversarial Networks(GAN) [11]
to generate fake opcodes sequence.
We use multiple machine learning classification techniques: Support Vector Ma-
chines, k -Nearest Neighbor, Random Forest and Naïve Bayes Classifier to differentiate
between fake and real samples and compare the 2 techniques (HMM and GAN) based
on their performance. The main goal of this project is to develop practical use cases for
fake malware opcode sequences and serve as a ‘‘proof-of-concept’’ for using generative
modelling to synthesize mnemonic opcode sequences.
In Chapter 2, we go over some previous and related work. We also give a brief
summary of the techniques and concepts we are using for this project. In Chapter 3
we explain our workflow and give a description of our malware generation pipeline.
In Chapter 4 we go over the actual implementation and our experimental setup. In
Chapter 5 we provide the results of our experiments and finally in Chapter 6 we




In this chapter, we discuss the background of malware classification and use of
generative modelling for the same. We lay out some of the drawbacks of malware as
images classification and highlight the gap in the literature with respect to generat-
ed/synthetic malware opcode samples.
We also give a brief introduction to Hidden Markov Models, Generative Adversarial
Networks and the Machine Learning techniques used to evaluate our results.
2.1 Background and Related Work
A recent trend in malware research is creating images from malware executable
files and using them to perform malware detection and classification. This gives the
opportunity to use image-analysis techniques and allows for the use of powerful deep
neural networks which perform exceptionally well with images. For example, in [12] S.
Yajamanam et al. extract features from malware images known as gist-descriptors and
classified malware samples using these features with k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm.
Then they compare the performance of gist-descriptors versus deep neural networks.
In both cases they received excellent results, with over 90% accuracy. In [13], the
authors classified malware images using a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and
achieved excellent classification results with 100% accuracy for 14 out 25 malware
families that they considered.
The examples above show clear advantages of using deep learning techniques
with image-based data. In terms of generative modelling, many researchers have used
malware images to generate malware samples as that gives the advantage of boosting
the dataset and even performing data augmentation to real samples so that they
conform to some obfuscated malware samples. In [14], the authors used Variational
Auto Encoder (VAE) and GANs to boost malware dataset and saw a 2% increase in
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accuracy in case of VAE and 6% increase in case of GAN. They also used malware as
images. A very similar research is [15] where the authors used GAN and observed a
6% increase in accuracy using the benchmark ResNet-18 model trained on malware
data.
Data augmentation or boosting using malware as images and generative modelling
techniques is becoming increasingly popular. But the drawback of this technique
is that converting malware files to images is computationally expensive. Moreover,
training deep convolutional networks is also computationally expensive and it takes a
long time to train and test the models. Using GANs with images has similar overheads.
In [16], Weiwei Hu and Ying Tan propose a GAN based model that is able to
bypass black-box malware detection systems which almost 0 detection rate. They
used API features extracted from the malware samples as they are executed in a
virtual environment such as a sandbox. This model is called ‘‘MalGAN’’ and certainly
performed very well. But executing malware in sandbox environment to get the API
features is again an overhead.
There is a gap in the literature when it comes generating malware samples using
non-image features or representations of malware. So we explore this gap by utilizing
mnemonic opcodes extracted from malware files and generating mnemonic opcode
samples using HMM and 3 different GAN architectures (see Section 2.3, 2.4, 2.5).
2.2 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a machine learning technique which is widely and
effectively used for statistical analysis of timeseries or sequential data. They have been
successfully used in speech analysis and recognition [17], malware classification [18]
and genes sequence analysis [19].
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Table 1: HMM notation.
Symbol Description
𝑀 Number of distinct observation symbols
𝑁 Number of hidden states
𝑇 Length of the observation sequence
𝒪 Observation sequence
𝑄 Set of distinct states
𝑉 Set of all possible observations
𝐴 State transition probability matrix
𝐵 State-Observation probability matrix
𝜋 Initial state probability matrix
2.2.1 HMM Introduction and Working
A Markov model is defined as a statistical model which has states and the
transition probabilities from one state to another is known [20]. In a Markov Model,
the states are known to an observer. On the other hand, in an HMM the underlying
states are not known to the observer. The state transition probability between states
is known and the probability distribution of observing a set of observation symbols
for each state is know [20].
Some notations required to understand HMM are given in Table 1. From Table 1
we see that 𝑉 is the set of possible observations and 𝑀 is the total number of
unique observation symbols. In other words, |𝑉 | = 𝑀 and 𝑉 = {0, 1, ...,𝑀 − 1}.
Additionally, observation sequence, 𝒪, of length 𝑇 is comprised of 𝑉 , i.e., 𝒪𝑖 ∈
𝑉, for 𝑖 = 0, 1, .., 𝑇 − 1.
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An HMM model is denoted by 𝜆. It is characterized by the matrices 𝐴,𝐵 and 𝜋.
The matrix 𝐴 denotes the state transition probability between 2 states. It’s dimensions
are 𝑁 ×𝑁 .
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑞𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡+ 1 | 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑞𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
where, 𝐴 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗}. The B matrix, 𝐵 = {𝑏𝑗(𝑘)} is of dimension 𝑁 ×𝑀 and denotes
the probability of observing a symbol 𝒪𝑘 at time 𝑡 when in state 𝑞𝑖:
𝑏𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑃 (𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑘 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 | 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑞𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
We can use HMM to solve 3 Problems:
1. Problem 1: Given an observation sequence, 𝒪, and a model 𝜆, we can find
𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). This means that we can compute a score for the sequence 𝒪 w.r.t.
𝜆 [20].
2. Problem 2: Given a model 𝜆 and an observation sequence 𝒪, we can determine
the hidden states of the Hidden Markov Model. That is, we can uncover the
Markov process underneath [20].
3. Problem 3: Given an observation sequence 𝒪 and dimensions 𝑁 and 𝑀 , we can
find the model 𝜆 of the given dimensions that best represents 𝒪. This basically
means we are training the model to match the observation sequence [20].
The solution to these problems is implemented via the Baum-Welch algorithm [21]. It
uses a forward and backward algorithm to find the unknown parameters of the Hidden
Markov Model, or in other words, to train the model (Problem 3). Additionally, the
forward algorithm is used to solve Problem 1 and the backward algorithm is used to
solve Problem 2. The 𝛾 matrix from the Baum-Welch algorithm contains a probability
value for each state at time 𝑡, where 𝑡 ∈ {0, 1, .., 𝑇 − 1}. So its dimensions are 𝑇 ×𝑁 .
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We find the most likely hidden state sequence by finding the states 𝑄𝑖 at 𝑡 with the
highest probability. So this gives us most likely state sequence of length 𝑇 .
In our case, we need to solve all 3 of the problems. More details on why we need
to solve all 3 problems are given in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
HMM is a hill climb algorithm, that means that it finds the local maxima on
the parameter space 𝐴,𝐵 and 𝜋. To ensure a global maximum, we need to train the
model multiple times and each time with a random initialization of the parameters
𝐴,𝐵 and 𝜋. This is the concept of ‘‘random restarts’’ in HMM [20].
2.3 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Network(GAN) is one the most exciting topic in the field
of generative modelling and Machine Learning right now. GAN was introduced by Ian
J. Goodfellow et al. [11] in 2014. The GAN model consists of 2 neural networks: the
discriminator and the generator which participate in a zero-sum game to achieve Nash
equilibrium. The objective of the 2 networks is different from each other but the overall
objective of the network is to generate data samples that conform to a probability
distribution 𝑝𝑔 which is similar to the true data’s probability distribution 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒. The
generator tries to fool the discriminator by getting it to classify the generated samples
as real and the discriminator tries to identify the samples as fake or real.
2.3.1 GAN Working and Architecture
Table 2 shows the notation used in defining the GAN Architecture. The discrimi-
nator, 𝐷, is trained such that on seeing a true sample, 𝑥∼𝑝𝑡, it classifies it accurately
as a real sample by maximizing the log likelihood of 𝐷(𝑥). Conversely, 𝐷 is trained
such that on seeing a fake sample 𝑧∼𝑝𝑔, it classifies it as fake giving a probability as
close to 0 as possible. This is achieved by maximizing the log likelihood of 1−𝐷(𝐺(𝑧)):
max
𝐷
E𝑥∼𝑝𝑡 [log𝐷(𝑥)] + E𝑧∼𝑝𝑧 [log 1−𝐷(𝐺(𝑧))] (1)
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𝑧 Random noise belonging to probability distribution 𝑝𝑧
𝑝𝑡 Probability distribution of true data samples
𝑝𝑔 Probability distribution of 𝐺’s output 𝐺(𝑧)
𝐷(.) Output of 𝐷 for any input .
𝐺(.) Output of 𝐺 for any input .
𝑉 (𝐷,𝐺) Cost function for the GAN
On the other hand, the generator, 𝐺, is trained such that 𝐷, on seeing a fake




E𝑧∼𝑝𝑧 [log 1−𝐷(𝐺(𝑧))] (2)
Since the Generator’s objective is independent of the Discriminator’s predictions on






𝑉 (𝐷,𝐺) = E𝑥∼𝑝𝑡 [log𝐷(𝑥)] + E𝑧∼𝑝𝑧 [log 1−𝐷(𝐺(𝑧))] (3)
This is the minimax game that the Generator and Discriminator play. The authors of
the original paper showed that once the Generator is trained to optimum, 𝑝𝑔 gets very
close to 𝑝𝑡 and consequently, 𝐷 becomes very close to 1/2. Equation (3) is essentially
finding the divergence between the probability distribution 𝑝𝑔 and 𝑝𝑡 minimizing the
Jensen-Shannon(JS) divergence between these 2 probability distributions as shown in
Theorem 1 in [11] and [22].
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Figure 1: GAN training pipeline [25].
2.3.2 GAN Training
When actually training the model, the loss function used is Binary Crossen-
tropy [23] which calculates the difference in the probability distribution of true
samples, labelled 1, and false samples labelled as 0. The weights of both models are
updated independently of each other using 2 loss functions on the models parame-
terized by their weights: 𝐺(𝑧 : 𝜃𝑔) and 𝐷(𝑥 : 𝜃𝑑). The formal algorithm for GAN
training is given in Algorithm 1. Figure 1 shows the training steps graphically.
The authors of the paper mentioned that we can use any optimizer to update the
weights of both the models. They suggested that momentum based optimizers, like
Adam [24], with low learning rate (1𝑒− 3 ∼ 1𝑒− 5) work well as they allow for faster
convergence of both the networks.
2.3.3 GAN Limitations
Although GANs excel in learning complex data distributions, there exist major
challenges in training of GANs such as mode collapse, vanishing gradient, internal
covariate shift, failure mode etc. To overcome these challenges, several novel variants
and architectures of GANs have been researched and implemented. [26] and [27]
provide a comprehensive analysis of the challenges in GAN training and pros and cons
of various GAN architectures.
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Algorithm 1 GAN Training [11].
Require:
𝐺: generator, 𝐷: discriminator, 𝑚: mini-batch size, 𝑥𝑖: real samples belonging to
𝑝𝑡, 𝑧𝑖: noise samples from known distribution 𝑝𝑧
for number of epochs do
Sample a minibatch of size 𝑚 from real data: {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑡
Sample a minibatch of noise of size 𝑚 : {𝑧1, 𝑧2, ..., 𝑧𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑧
Generate fake samples using 𝑧𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, ..,𝑚}: {𝐺(𝑧1), ..., 𝐺(𝑧𝑚)}






[log𝐷(𝑥𝑖) + log (1−𝐷(𝐺(𝑧𝑖)))]
Sample a minibatch of noise of size 𝑚 : {𝑧1, 𝑧2, ..., 𝑧𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑧









Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [28] was first proposed in 2017 by M. Arjovsky et
al. as an improvement over the vanilla GAN. They first published a paper [22]
highlighting the important theoretical implications of GAN training as proposed by
Ian J. Goodfellow et al. [11] and laid out the mathematical reasoning and proofs for
some of the issues surrounding GAN training, as explained in Section 2.3.3.
2.4.1 WGAN working
The main idea of the WGAN is that instead of optimizing the JS Divergence
between 2 probability distributions 𝑝𝜃 and 𝑝𝑡, use of a different distance metric
as the loss function is proposed which is called the Wasserstein distance or Earth-
Mover distance is proposed (in this section we represent the generator’s probability
distribution with 𝑝𝜃 instead of 𝑝𝑔 to conform to the notations used by the authors). The
Wasserstein distance is a measure of distance between 2 probability distributions. It is
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referred to as the Earth-Mover distance because it can be thought of as the minimum
amount of energy cost required to transform the shape of a pile of dirt representing a
probability distribution into the shape of another. The dirt is ‘‘transported’’ from one
pile to another and the cost is calculated as the mass moved times the distance.
In [28], the authors explain why using JS Divergence, or some other distance
metrics, such as KL Divergence is not conducive to optimally training the discriminator,
In fact, they give an example, Example 1 in [28] which shows that in come cases
the value of JS Divergence goes to 0 and hence, when the discriminator is trained to
optimality, i.e., when it can perfectly classify fake vs real data samples, then the value
of loss function in Equation (3) provides no meaningful feedback to the generator. No
learning takes place from there on as the model saturates.
Equation (4) represents the formula for Wasserstein distance between 2 probability
distributions in a continuous probability domain.







(𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) represents the set of all possible join probability distributions
between 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝜃 and 𝛾 ∈
∏︀
(𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) indicates one out of many ‘‘dirt’’ transport plans.
Finally, 𝛾(𝑥, 𝑦) indicates the amount of ‘‘mass’’ to be moved from 𝑥 to 𝑦 in order to
transform 𝑝𝑡 to 𝑝𝜃. The EM distance is the infimum or the smallest value of ‘‘cost’’
out of all the plans.
Exhausting all join distributions between 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝜃 is intractable. So, the authors
applied a smart transformation to the formula in (4) using the Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality to get:





E𝑥∼𝑝𝑡 [𝑓(𝑥)]− E𝑥∼𝑝𝜃 [𝑓(𝑥)] (5)
where the infimum is replaced with the supremum, which means the maximum
value and 𝑝𝜃 is the probability distribution for generator’s outputs. The condition
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‖𝑓‖𝐿 ≤ 𝐾 implies that the function 𝑓 is K-Lipschitz continuous. A function 𝑓 : R→ R
is K-Lipschitz continuous if there exists a real number 𝐾 ≥ 0, s.t., ∀(𝑥1, 𝑥2) ∈ R:
| 𝑓(𝑥1)− 𝑓(𝑥2) |≤ 𝐾 | 𝑥1 − 𝑥2 |
where K is known as the Lipschitz constant for function 𝑓 . Now, suppose there is a
family of functions {𝑓𝑤}𝑤∈𝒲 where they are all K-Lipschitz continuous and 𝑤 is the
set of optimal weights and 𝒲 is the set of possible weights, then the problem to solve
i.e. the loss function, becomes:
𝐿(𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) = 𝑊 (𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) = max
𝑤∈𝒲
E𝑥∼𝑝𝑡 [𝑓𝑤(𝑥)]− E𝑧∼𝑝𝑧 [𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧))] (6)
where 𝑝𝑧 is the noise distribution from which 𝑧 is sampled, 𝐺𝜃 represents the generator
parameterized by the weights 𝜃 and the ‘‘discriminator’’ is parameterized by the
optimal set of weights 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 .
The ‘‘discrimiantor’’ is no longer predicting whether a sample is fake or real, it is
simply trying to learn a K-Lipschitz continuous function that will help in calculating
the Wasserstein distance between 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝜃. Due to this, the authors of the paper call
this model the ‘‘critic’’ instead of discriminator.
Since we already know that neural networks are designed to learn functions, we
can train the neural network to learn the K-Lipschitz continuous function {𝑓𝑤}𝑤∈𝒲
and train the critic to optimal. This will allow for an estimation of the Wasserstein
distance up to a multiplicative constant (𝐾). In the next section, we explain how the
training of a WGAN works.
2.4.2 WGAN Training
We need to first understand how the generator, 𝑔𝜃, updates its weights. We can
get the gradient for 𝜃 using Equation (6) as:
∇𝜃𝑊 (𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) = ∇𝜃(E𝑥∈𝑝𝑡 [𝑓𝑤(𝑥)]− E𝑧∈𝑝𝑧 [𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧))])
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which gives
∇𝜃𝑊 (𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) = −E𝑧∈𝑝𝑧 [∇𝜃𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧))]) (7)
To train a WGAN we need to find the optimal 𝑓𝑤. To do this, for a fixed value of 𝑔𝜃,
we try to train the critic to optimality and obtain the optimal 𝑓𝑤 for the Wasserstein
distance. Once we have an optimal 𝑓𝑤, we update the generator’s weights, 𝜃, through
back propagation as given in Equation (7). This process involves training the critic
more times than the generator since our goal is to train the critic to optimality
(formally, we have 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 iterations per generator iteration and the authors recommend
a value between 5 and 10). This way the gradient information that will be back
propagated through the network will be very efficient and the generator can update
it’s weights effectively. The authors state the use of RMSProp optimizer instead of
Adam [24] citing higher stability and better performance.
However, there is 1 constraint in the training algorithm which is to ensure that
𝑓𝑤 is K-Lipschitz continuous throughout the training. To achieve this, the authors
use a very simple but effective trick: The value of the weights, 𝑤, is clamped within
a compact space 𝒲 such as [−0.01, 0.01]. This way, 𝑓𝑤 receives an upper and lower
bound and is Lipschitz continuous in this space. The formal algorithm for WGAN
training is given in Algorithm 2
2.4.3 WGAN limitations
The main drawback of the WGAN algorithm is the way K-Lipschitz continuity
is enforced. Clipping the weights into a compact space [−𝑐, 𝑐] is not a very good way
to enforce this constraint. It can lead to the model failing to learn more complex
distributions and even saturating before reaching optimality. To quote the authors of
the paper themselves: ‘‘Weight clipping is a clearly terrible way to enforce a Lipschitz
constraint. If the clipping parameter is large, then it can take a long time for any
weights to reach their limit, thereby making it harder to train the critic till optimality.
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Algorithm 2 WGAN Training [28]. Default parameter values are: 𝛼 = 0.00005,
𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 5 and 𝑐 = 0.01
Require:
𝛼: learning rate, 𝑚: mini-batch size, 𝑐: clipping size, 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐: number of critic
iterations per generator iteration, 𝐶𝑤: critic parameterized by weights 𝑤, 𝐺𝜃:
generator parameterized by weights 𝜃.
while 𝜃 has not converged do
for t = 0, 1,.., 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 do
Sample a minibatch of size 𝑚 from real data: {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑡
Sample a minibatch of noise of size 𝑚 : {𝑧1, 𝑧2, ..., 𝑧𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑧







𝑤 ← 𝑤 + 𝛼 · RMSProp(𝑤,𝐶𝑤)
𝑤 ← 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑝(𝑤,−𝑐, 𝑐)
end for
Sample a minibatch of noise of size 𝑚 : {𝑧1, 𝑧2, ..., 𝑧𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑧
𝐺𝜃 ← −∇𝜃 1𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧𝑖))
𝜃 ← 𝜃 − 𝛼 ·𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝜃,𝐺𝜃)
end while
If the clipping is small, this can easily lead to vanishing gradients when the number
of layers is big, or batch normalization is not used (such as in RNNs).’’
2.5 WGAN with Gradient Penalty
Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP) [29] was first introduced
in 2017 by Ishaan Gulrajani et al. The main objective of this architecture is to
overcome the drawback of WGAN which is the way Lipschitz continuity is enforced.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the value of the weights 𝑤 is clamped in a compact
space 𝒲 so that 𝑓𝑤 is bound and K-Lipschitz continuous in this range. This is a clear
limitation in WGAN (see Section 2.4.3).
To overcome this, the authors in [29] propose an improved WGAN training
method. They present Corollary 1 in [29] which claims that the optimal critic in
WGAN has gradient norm equal to 1 and it is 1-Lipschitz continuous. Using this
fact, a ‘‘penalty’’ is imposed on the critic if it’s gradient’s norm deviates from 1. The
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objective function of WGAN-GP now changes to:
𝐿(𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝜃) = E𝑥∈𝑝𝑡 [𝑓𝑤(𝑥)]− E𝑧∈𝑝𝑧 [𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧))] + 𝜆E?̂?∈𝑝?̂? [(‖∇?̂?𝑓𝑤(?̂?)‖2 − 1)
2] (8)
The last term on the right side is the gradient penalty. 𝜆 is the penalty coefficient
and is set to 10 [29].
In Equation 8, the distribution 𝑝?̂? is defined implicitly as sampling uniformly
from straight lines formed by pair of points belonging to 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝜃, where 𝑝𝜃 is
the generator’s distribution as defined by 𝐺𝜃(𝑧). When actually implementing the
algorithm, ?̂? is estimated by taking a weighted average between pair of data samples
(𝑥, 𝑦) such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑝𝜃 or 𝐺𝜃(𝑧). Usually ?̂? is known as the interpolated
sample. The authors also suggested the use of Adam optimizer instead of RMSProp
as it performed better. The formal algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 WGAN with Gradient Penalty Training [29]. Default parameter values
are: 𝜆 = 10, 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 5, 𝛼 = 0.0001, 𝛽1 = 0 and 𝛽2 = 0.9
Require:
𝑚: mini-batch size, 𝜆: penalty coefficient, 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐: number of critic iterations per
generator iteration, 𝛼, 𝛽1, 𝛽2: Adam parameters, 𝐶𝑤: critic parameterized by weights
𝑤, 𝐺𝜃: generator parameterized by weights 𝜃.
while 𝜃 has not converged do
for t = 0, 1,.., 𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 do
for i=1, 2,..., m do
Sample 𝑥 ∈ 𝑝𝑡, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑝𝑧 and random number 𝜖 ∈ 𝑈 [0, 1]
?̃?← 𝐺𝜃(𝑧)
Interpolated sample: ?̂? = 𝜖𝑥+ (1− 𝜖)?̃?
𝐿𝑖 = 𝑓𝑤(?̃?)− 𝑓𝑤(𝑥) + 𝜆(‖∇?̂?𝑓𝑤(?̂?)‖2 − 1)2
end for
𝐶𝑤 ← ∇𝑤 1𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑖
𝑤 ← Adam(𝑤,𝐶𝑤, 𝛼, 𝛽1, 𝛽2)
end for
Sample a minibatch of noise of size 𝑚 : {𝑧1, 𝑧2, ..., 𝑧𝑚} belonging to 𝑝𝑧
𝐺𝜃 ← −∇𝜃 1𝑚
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑓𝑤(𝐺𝜃(𝑧𝑖))
𝜃 ← Adam(𝜃,𝐺𝜃, 𝛼, 𝛽1, 𝛽2)
end while
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Algorithm 3 is very similar to WGAN’s algorithm (Algorithm 2) minus the weight
clipping part and the addition of the gradient penalty.
2.6 k-Nearest Neighbor
k -Nearest Neighbor (kNN) is a supervised classification algorithm. The k in
kNN stands for the number of neighbors to consider. To classify an input, say 𝑥, the
algorithm considers ‘‘k ’’ points from the given training data such that the k points
are nearest to 𝑥. Then a class is assigned to 𝑥 depending on the majority of classes in
the 𝑘 neighbors. The distance metric used to calculate the distance between points
can be Euclidean, Manhattan, Minkowski etc [30]. The most widely used metric is
Euclidean distance.
An advantage of kNN algorithm is that there is no training or model fitting to
be done. The labelled training data is just used to calculate the distance between
input points and assign classes thereafter. The disadvantage is that although there is
no training, testing data can take a long time especially with large datasets of high
dimensions.
An example of kNN algorithm is given in Figure 2. There are 2 classes of data,
class A (yellow) and class B (pink). When a new input, red, is to be classified and
the value of k=3, then 3 nearest neighbors to red are calculated. We can see that 2 of
the 3 belong to class B and 1 belongs to class A. So the red input will be assigned
class B. On the other hand, when k=6, 4 of the nearest neighbors belong to class A
and only 2 belong to B. In that case, the red input will be assigned to class A.
2.7 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [32] is a supervised machine learning algorithm
that tries to generate a decision boundary between 2 classes of data, known as the
hyperplane. It is a binary classifier that can be extended for multi-class classification
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Figure 2: kNN classification example. [31]
by utilizing techniques such as One-vs-Rest. The main idea behind SVM is to find a
hyperplane such that the distance between the hyperplane and the closest point from
the 2 classes is maximized. This distance is called the margin. The hyperplane with
the maximum margin is the optimal solution. Figure 3 shows the possible separation
hyper-planes between the data points belonging to 2 different classes and Figure 4
shows the optimal hyperplane such that the margin is maximum. Sometimes when a
Figure 3: Possible hyperplanes [33]. Figure 4: Optimal hyperplane [33].
clean hyperplane cannot be found, the data is projected into a higher dimension so
that a clean separation boundary is possible, but this increases the complexity and
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may make it intractable. In 1992, a new technique known as the kernel trick [34] was
invented which allows SVM to work efficiently for higher dimensional data.
2.8 Naïve Bayes Classifier
Naïve Bayes Classifier [35] is a supervised learning algorithm that uses Bayes
theorem to compute the probability of an observation belonging to a particular class.
The Bayes theorem or formula is:
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑝(𝐴|𝐵) 𝑝(𝐵)
𝑝(𝐴)
(9)
where, 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) is the posterior probability, meaning the probability of hypothesis 𝐵
given data 𝐴, 𝑝(𝐴|𝐵) is the probability of data 𝐴 given hypothesis 𝐵 is true, 𝑝(𝐵) is
called the prior probability, meaning the probability of 𝐵, 𝑝(𝐴) is the probability of
data 𝐴.
The algorithm is called ‘‘Naïve’’ because it makes an assumption that the input
features are independent of each other. During training, probability of observing
a feature is calculated for each class using Equation (9). For classification, the
probability of an input belonging to every class is calculated and the class with the
highest probability is assigned to the input vector.
2.9 Random Forest
Random Forest is a supervised machine learning algorithm. It is an ensemble
technique which means that it utilizes existing classification techniques and combines
them to produce a stronger classifier.
The underlying principle behind Random Forest is decision tree. Random Forest
consists of multiple decision trees which are created when fitting the training data.
During testing, each decision tree outputs a prediction and the majority of these
outputs is selected as the final class output by the Random Forest classifier. Each
individual decision tree is built or grown as follows:
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1. Select a subset of training data.
2. Select a set of features randomly from the subset of the data and start splitting
the tree node.
3. The node is split into 2 child nodes so as to maximize the difference between
the features of 2 new groups and minimize the difference between features inside
a group.
4. Nodes are split until perfect groups are obtained or until the specified maximum
depth is reached.
A combination of multiple decision trees each trained as explained above with a




In this chapter, we detail our fake malware generation pipeline, feature extraction
for fake sample evaluation and the machine learning pipeline for our experiments.
3.1 Fake Malware using HMM
The methodology adopted for generating fake malware samples using HMM is
explained below:
1. Create observation sequence, 𝒪, of length 𝑇 = 30, 000 for each family.
2. Train 21 HMM models for each malware family with 𝑇 = 30, 000, 𝑁 = 2 and
𝑀 ∈ {20, 21, ..., 40}, where 𝑀 is taken as top 𝑀 − 1 most frequent opcodes and
every opcode not present in top 𝑀 − 1 was marked as ‘‘other’’, or 𝑀 . Chapter 4
explains why we chose these values for 𝑀 .
3. Score these 21 HMM models for each family by testing them against samples
from the other 4 families and benign dataset.
4. Select the best value of 𝑀 , say 𝑀 ′, from these models for each family and train
10 HMM models be setting 𝑁 = 𝑀 = 𝑀 ′.
5. Score the 10 models for each family.
6. Select the 2 highest scoring models from Step 4 and use their 𝛾 matrix to find
out the most likely state sequence of the HMM model.
7. The most likely state sequence represents the fake samples. Score and evaluate
these fake samples as explained in Section 3.4.
21
3.2 Fake Malware using GAN
The methodology adopted for generating fake malware samples using GANs is
explained below:
1. We use 3 different GAN architectures to generate fake samples: Vanilla GAN
(or just GAN), Wasserstein GAN and Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty.
2. Train GAN models for each family and save generator models at an interval of
200 epochs for GAN and 500 for WGAN and WGAN with gradient penalty.
3. Generate fake samples in batches of 32 using the saved generative models.
4. Evaluate them against real data samples by simply testing the integer vectors
(see 3.3) representing real samples and fake samples.
5. Repeat Step 4 5 times and the average the results.
6. Select the best scoring model as the final generative model for each family, giving
a total of 5 generator models per architecture.
7. The models selected in Step 6 are used to generate fake samples for each family
and the samples are evaluated as explained in Section 3.4.
8. Repeat Steps 2-6 for WGAN and WGAN-GP architectures.
This process is explained in more detail in Section 3.4.2.
3.3 Feature Extraction
In this section we explain our feature extraction process and the types of features
used for evaluation. We extract 3 different features from the real and fake samples to
train our machine learning models.
• Normal integer vector conversion of opcodes: We simply map the
mnemonic opcodes to integers.
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• Word2Vec: We treat the real samples as our corpus and create Word2Vec
embedding of length 100 for each opcode. We use this embedding to create a
vector for each data sample by simply summing up the embedding vector of
each opcode in a given sample and normalizing it by the length of the sample.
• n-grams: We create bigrams (n=2) from the real dataset and find the top 20
bigrams based on the frequency. Then, a vector of length 20 is created for each
data sample which contains the frequency count of these 20 bigrams. We treat
these vectors as our bigram features.
3.4 Evaluation
We evaluate all the HMM models by creating the Receiver Operating Character-
istic (ROC) curve for each model and calculating the AUC.
3.4.1 HMM Evaluation
HMM scores represent the log likelihood value of an observation sequence belong-
ing to the trained model. An ROC curve is created to show the classification status of
a model at different thresholds. A threshold value is defined for probabilistic models
such that values above a threshold are considered belonging to class A and values
below the threshold are considered belonging to class B (or class NOT A).
Fixing a threshold is not good practice since it doesn’t always lead to accurate
classification. Instead, different values of threshold are considered one by one and
the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are calculated for each
threshold value. An ROC curve plots the TPR vs. FPR.
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑇𝑃 ) = classified as true and are actually true.
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑇𝑁) = classified as false and are actually false.
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝐹𝑃 ) = classified as true but are actually false.
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝑇𝑁) = classified as false but are actually true.
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Area Under the Curve (AUC) is simply the area under the ROC curve. It provides
an overall measure of the classification performance. AUC is in range [0, 1] and a
larger AUC value means better classification with 0 meaning all predictions were
wrong and 1 meaning all predictions were right.
3.4.2 GAN Evaluation
The most common application for GANs is in the image domain. Most researches
use benchmark datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet etc to evaluate the
performance of their GANs. A batch of generated images is saved every few hundred
epochs, like 200, and they are visually inspected. There are 2 common metrics used to
evaluate the quality of generated images: Inception Score [36] and Fréchet Inception
Distance (FID) [37].
In our case, we are generating opcode sequences and which can’t be inspected
visually and Inception Score and FID scores are defined only for images. So to evaluate
our GAN models, we saved the generative model at every 200 epochs for GAN and 500
epochs for WGAN and WGAN with gradient penalty. From all the saved generative
models we generated fake samples and classified them against real samples using
Random Forest classifier. The model, identified by the epoch number (0, 200, 500
and so on), that gave the lowest classification results is chosen as the best generative
model from that architecture. The best model is then used for evaluation as explained
in the next section.
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3.4.3 Accuracy, Precision and Recall
To score and evaluate the quality of the fake samples (HMM and GANs), we
trained 4 machine learning models and calculated the Accuracy, Precision and Recall
for each model with each feature.
• Randomly sample 100 real data data samples and take 100 fake samples.
• Extract features from real and fake samples as mentioned in Section 3.3.
• Fit 4 different models; SVM, Random Forest, Naive Bayes classifier and k -
Nearest Neighbor; on the training data using 5-fold cross validation.
• Calculate the accuracy, precision and recall for each split done by 5-fold cross
validation and use the average as the final result.
Accuracy
Accuracy is a measure of correct predictions vs total predictions made. For binary
classification, it can be represented using TP, TN, FP and FN:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
Precision
Precision is a measure of the data samples classified correctly as positive vs all samples





Recall is a measure of the data samples classified correctly as positive vs all the
actually positive samples. In other words, it measures how many positive data samples







In this chapter, we give a detailed explanation of our dataset, the configuration
of our HMM models, the different GAN architectures used and the machine learning
techniques used for evaluation of our fake samples.
4.1 Dataset
Out dataset consists of 5 malware families and a benign dataset. Each malware
family has over 1000 samples and the benign dataset has over 700 samples containing
mnemonic opcode sequences. We began with the Malicia dataset [38] which has over
50 malware families with already extracted opcodes and selected WinWebSec and
Zbot since these 2 families had more than 1000 samples each. The rest of the 3
families were collected from a huge dataset using VirusShare [39]. The dataset has
over 120,000 malware executable and is around 100 Gigabytes in size. We selected
Renos, VBInject and OnLineGames from this dataset.
We used objdump which is a command line program part of the GNU Binary Utilities
library for Unix-like operating systems. It is used to disassemble executables into
Assembly code and hence extract the mnemonic opcodes. An example of how this is
used is shown in Figure 5.
For the sake of the example we limit the output to 5 opcodes using head -n 5
argument. We ran a Python script which recursively extracted up to 8000 opcodes
from every file belonging to the 3 families. A summary of our dataset along with each
Figure 5: Example usage of objdump.
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Table 3: Dataset summary
Malware Family Type Samples
Benign Benign samples 706
OnLineGames Password Stealer 1513
Renos Trojan Downloader 1568
VBInject Worm 2694
WinWebSec Rogue 4360
Zbot Password Stealer 2136
malware family’s type is given in Table 3.
4.2 HMM Implementation
We needed to solve all 3 HMM problems for our tasks. The solution to problem
3 allowed us to train an HMM model so that it represents our observation sequence,
which is opcodes from each family. The solution to problem 1 allowed us to score
data samples and evaluate the quality of our model. Finally, the solution to problem
2 allowed us to use the 𝛾 matrix so that we can find the hidden state sequence.
The HMM algorithm was implemented as per the algorithm given in [20]. We
wrote the code in C++ since training HMM is an expensive task and high-level
programming languages such as Python are slow compared to C++. We wrote a
Python script to preprocess our data and create our observation sequence, 𝒪, of length
𝑇 = 30, 000. We concatenated the mnemonic opcodes from different samples of a
family until we reached a length of 30, 000. This was done for all 5 families in our
dataset.
Table 4 shows the number of unique opcodes in each observation sequence. The
number of unique opcodes for each family is very high and setting 𝑀 to such large
values makes training of HMM models computationally infeasible. So we experimented
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with selecting the top 𝑛 most frequent opcodes from the observation sequence, where,
𝑛 ∈ {20, 21, ..., 40}. Figure 6 shows the top 20 opcodes from our combined observation
Table 4: Unique Opcodes in observation sequences for each family






sequences and the number of families a particular opcode is present in. As we can see,
out of the top 20 opcodes, 19 of them are present in all 5 families. Similarly, Figure 7
shows this distribution for the top 40 opcodes. Out of the top 40 opcodes, 26 of them
are present in all 5 families. So we decided that the range for 𝑀 ∈ {20, 21, ..., 40} is
the best choice.
Next, we converted the mnemonic opcodes to integers so that we can use them
to solve Problem 3 of HMM, which is training the model to best fit the observation
sequence. For each value of 𝑀 as described above, we took the 𝑀 − 1 most frequent
opcodes and mapped them to integer {0, 1, ..,𝑀 − 2}. Every other opcode which is
not present in the top 𝑀 − 1 was labelled as ‘‘other’’, i.e., 𝑀 − 1. For example, when
𝑀 = 20, we mapped the top 19 opcodes to integers {0, 1, .., 18} and then the opcodes
not present in the top 19 were marked as 19. This gives us 20 unique observation
symbols ∈ {0, 1, .., 19}.
We set the value of 𝑁 = 2 for our initial experiments which were to figure out the
best value of 𝑀 . Now, we have different values of 𝑀 ∈ {20, 21, ..., 40} and value of
𝑁 = 2. For each family, this gives us 21 different HMM models of different dimensions
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Figure 6: Top 20 opcodes from the observation sequences and the number of families
they are present in.
for each family. The models were trained with 50000 random restarts so that we can
maximize the chance of finding the global maxima. After training the models for a
family, we tested them as follows:
• We sampled 500 malware samples (their extracted opcode sequences) from the
family that the HMM model belongs to. These are the true samples so we
labelled them as +1.
• We sampled 100 samples each from the rest of the 4 families, giving us a total
of 400 samples. These are the false samples so we labelled them as -1.
• We sampled 100 samples from the benign dataset and labelled them as -1 as
well.
• Finally, we have 500 true samples (labelled 1) and 500 false samples (labelled
-1), giving a total of 1000 samples to score. Every sample consisting of opcode
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Figure 7: Top 40 opcodes from the observation sequences and the number of families
they are present in.
sequences was truncated to a length of 1200 because each sequence has a different
length.
• We calculated the log likelihood of each sample belonging to a model and plotted
the ROC curve. Finally, the AUC was calculated from these ROC curves.
• The model with the highest AUC was chosen and the value of 𝑀 , say 𝑀 ′, from
that model was used for the rest of the experiments.
The above steps were repeated for each family. The optimum of 𝑀 for each family
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served as the dimensions of our HMM model in the next set of experiments: 𝑁 =
𝑀 = 𝑀 ′.
Our next experiments were to solve Problem 2 of HMM so that we can find the
most likely state sequence which will act as our fake malware samples generated using
HMM. For each family, our model dimensions were: 𝑁 ×𝑀 , where 𝑁 = 𝑀 = 𝑀 ′
and 𝑀 ′ is the best value of 𝑀 for each individual family.
We trained 10 different HMM models, each with 5000 random restarts for each
malware family. All 10 of these models were scored the same way as explained above,
using 500 true samples and 500 false samples. Out of these 10 models, we selected the
2 best models with the highest AUC value. The 𝛾 matrix from these 2 models was
used to find the most likely hidden state sequence. Each model gives us a sequence of
30,000 length. We divided this sequence into 50 ‘‘fake’’ samples of length 600 each.
This gives us a total of 100 fake samples per family.
4.3 GAN Implementation
We implemented all 3 GAN architectures in Python using TensorFlow and Keras
with TensorFlow backend. For vanilla GAN or just GAN, we used Adam optimizer
with the following parameters:
𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑚(𝑙𝑟 = 0.0003, 𝛽1 = 0.5, 𝛽2 = 0.99)
These parameters gave the best results so they were chosen. The loss function used
was Binary Crossentropy as it is equivalent to the loss function for GAN as given in
Equation (3). The models were trained for 10000 epochs.
For GANs the use of Batch Normalization [40] layer is recommended as the
training is done using minibatches of data. The variance in the input data implicitly
caused by minibatches slows down training and requires the use of very small learning
rates otherwise the gradients and weights of layers may change drastically from
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Figure 8: GAN Discriminator Architecture.
Figure 9: GAN Generator Architecture.
minibatch to minibatch. The overall architecture of our discriminator and generator
models is given in Figures 8 and 9.
For the discriminator we have 1 input layer, 2 fully connected hidden layers and
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an output layer with just 1 neuron. The activation function for the output layer
is Sigmoid since we are using Binary Crossentropy loss and Sigmoid gives a value
between [0, 1] which is interpreted as the score for a sample or the probability. The
activation function for the hidden layers is LeakyReLU. LeakyReLU is recommended
over ReLU because ReLU outputs 0 for all negative inputs which causes vanishing
gradients problem. LeakReLU has a hyperparameter called alpha which is used to




𝑥, 𝑥 ≥ 0
𝛼𝑥, 𝑥 < 0
The generator has 1 input layer, 3 fully connected hidden layers with a batch
normalization layer after every hidden layer and finally an output layer with 600
neurons, which is the length of the opcode sequence we want to generate. The
activation function for hidden layers is again, LeakyReLU and for the output layer we
used TanH. We scale all of our inputs between [−1, 1] and TanH also gives an output
between that range, which is what we want from the generator. We experimented
with different layers for both the networks including Convolutional 1D layers and
fully connected Dense layers had the best performance.
4.3.1 GAN Stabilizing Techniques
We further utilized stabilizing techniques to improve GAN training. All the
techniques are discussed in [36] which was published in 2016 by some of the co-authors
of the original 2014 paper on GANs [11]. The techniques were:
1. Minibatch Discrimination: In minibatch discrimination, instead of training
the discriminator on a batch of real and fake samples combined, the training is
split into 2 steps where 1st we train the discriminator on a batch of real samples
only and then on a batch of fake samples only. This techniques helps to prevent
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the generator from collapsing.
2. Label Smoothing: Instead of using just ‘‘1’’ as the ground truth labels for
real samples, labels are scaled between a range close to 1, for example between
[0.7, 1.2]. This is a common technique now days for deep neural network training
since it prevents over fitting of data.
3. Label Switching: In label switching, after every few epochs the labels for
real and fake samples are swapped for 1 epoch and then swapped back to
normal. This helps to keep the discriminator from becoming too confident. If
the discriminator is over confident, then the loss dips to 0 and generator stops
receiving any feedback to update it’s weights. This is known as failure mode.
4.4 WGAN Implementation
For WGAN, we used RMSProp optimizer. RMSProp is recommended by the
paper authors because the training was more stable for RMSProp as compared to
Adam which is momentum based. The learning rate chosen is also a small value:
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝑙𝑟 = 0.00001)
The architecture of our WGAN is the same for the critic and the generator, except
the input and output layers. Figure 10 shows the architecture for both the critic and
generator. We trained each WGAN model for 100000 epochs using minibatches of
data.
The actual models are compiled and trained separately for the critic and generator.
They are together in the figure just to show the architecture. For the generator we have
the same activation function for hidden layers (LeakyReLU) and output layer (TanH).
For the critic, however, we used no activation function or used linear activation in the
output layer. This is done so that the loss function in Equation (6) can be computed
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easily when implementing the WGAN algorithm given in Algorithm 2. These layers
and networks gave the best result so we chose these as our final networks.
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Figure 10: WGAN Critic and Generator Architecture.
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4.4.1 Wasserstein Distance
The loss function or the Wasserstein distance between real and fake samples
given in Equation (6) can be written as follows:
Critic loss = critic’s avg. real samples score - critic’s avg. fake samples score
Generator loss = - critic’s avg. fake samples score
This interpretation is correct because we want the critic network to learn the K-
Lipschitz function that will calculate the Wasserstein distance. We are only concerned
with the output of the function and not actually knowing the function. Assuming
the network has learnt the correct function, then we can interpret the Wasserstein
distance as the loss given above.
Since neural networks use stochastic gradient descent they seek to minimize the
loss values. For the generator, minimizing the loss value will mean that the critic will
be encouraged to score the fake samples higher. For example, a score of 5 on fake
samples will mean -5 loss for the generator and a score of 10 will mean -10 loss. For
the critic, in order to minimize the loss the score for real samples will be encouraged
to be small. This will maximize the distance between the generated and fake samples
(Equation (6)) and at the same time minimize both losses.
This is implemented simply by using no activation function in the output layer
for the critic and using -1 label for fake samples and +1 for fake samples. The code
snippet for this implementation can be found in Appendix C.
4.5 WGAN with Gradient Penalty Implementation
For WGAN with Gradient Penalty, we used Adam optimizer. Unlike WGAN,
momentum based optimizers seem to work well for WGAN-GP. The parameters for
the optimizer were:
𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑚(𝑙𝑟 = 0.0001, 𝛽1 = 0.5, 𝛽2 = 0.9)
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Figure 11: WGAN-GP Critic Architecture.
We trained each WGAN-GP model using minibatches for 100000 epochs. The
architectures for the critic and generator model are given in Figures 11 and 12. We
decided to use Convolutional 1D layers for the models because using fully connected
Dense layers had worse performance as compared to Conv1D layers. In the critic
network we used 3 hidden Conv1D layers with 64, 128 and 256 filters and filter size
3. In the generator network also we used 3 Conv1D layers with 64, 32 and 16 filters
and filter size 3. The activation functions for the hidden Conv1D layers is again
LeakyReLU.
The output layer of the generator is a fully connected Dense layer 600 neurons
and the activation function is again TanH. Similar to WGAN, the output layer of
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the critic network has no activation function because we still need to calculate the
Wasserstein loss/distance. Calculating the Wasserstein loss is part of the WGAN-GP
loss function given in Equation (8). The first 2 operands on the right hand side are the
Wasserstein distances which are calculated the same way as mentioned in Section 4.4.1.
The last or the 3rd operand on the right side is the actual gradient penalty.
In the actual implementation, the calculation of the penalty is very straightforward.
Using Keras backend ops we get the gradients for the critic network with respect to
the averaged/interpolated image. Then we calculate the Euclidean norm or L2-norm
of these gradients. Finally, the penalty is calculated: (1− 𝐿2_𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚)2. Appendix C
has the code snippet which shows the actual implementation of the gradient penalty
loss in Python using TensorFlow and Keras.
Finally, the authors advised against the use of Batch Normalization in the critic
network. They suggested that if required, Layer Normalization layer could be used.
We experimented with Layer Normalization layer but the performance degraded so
we decided not to use it. For the generator we still used Batch Normalization layer.
We used 𝜆 = 10, that is, the penalty coefficient and n_critic = 7. Additionally,
after every 500 epochs, we trained the critic for 100 iterations and then updated the
generator. This is a common practice and is done so that the critic is trained to
optimal value which is the aim for WGAN and WGAN-GP. This allows for exact
Wasserstein distance calculation instead of approximation and therefor generator gets
the correct gradient updates to converge properly.
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In this chapter, we give the results of our experiments.
5.1 HMM Results
The first set of experiments were conducted to determine the optimum value of
𝑀 for each family. Then next set of experiments were conducted to train the best
HMM models which were used to generate fake malware samples.
5.1.1 Optimum M and HMM Training Results
The summary of the results and the best value of 𝑀 chosen for each family is
given in Table 5. Appendix A contains ROC curves for each value of 𝑀 for each
family and also bar plots comparing the AUC scores of the 21 models from each family.
Table 5: Best value of M for each family






We fixed these values of 𝑀 for the rest of our experiments. For HMM models
to generate fake samples by solving Problem 2, we fixed the dimensions as 𝑁 = 𝑀 ,
where 𝑀 is the best value for each family as listed in Table 5.
Our next experiments were to train 10 different HMM models with dimensions
as mentioned above and choose the 2 best models out of 10. Figures 13, 14, 15, 16
and 17 show the AUC scores for 10 models from each family. The models chosen
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Figure 13: WinWebSec 22× 22 models. Figure 14: Zbot 20× 20 models.
Figure 15: Renos 22× 22 models. Figure 16: OnLineGames 22×22 models.
Figure 17: VBInject 25× 25 models.
and their AUC scores are summarized in Table 6. We chose the 2 highest scoring
models and calculated their most likely hidden state sequence using the 𝛾 matrix from
the models. After breaking the 2 𝛾 matrices of 30,000 length each into 100 samples
of length 600 each, we tested these fake samples against real samples as explained
in Sections 3.3, 3.4. Low accuracy, precision and recall scores mean that the model
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Table 6: Best 2 models for fake samples from each family.
Malware Family
Models
Model# AUC Model# AUC
WinWebSec F 0.875 H 0.816
Zbot B 0.856 I 0.827
Renos C 0.877 D 0.828
OnLineGames A 0.844 J 0.873
VBInject E 0.873 G 0.879
isn’t able to differentiate between real and fake samples. Results from each of the 4
algorithms are given in the following section.
5.1.2 HMM Classification Results
We first performed hyperparameter tuning for the 4 machine learning algorithms
and fixed the best parameters for the rest of the experiments.
1. SVM: Grid search on values of 𝐶, kernel and degree with values: 𝐶 ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 10}, 𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙 ∈ {𝑟𝑏𝑓, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦, 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟} and 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}. We found
that polynomial kernels were overfitting the data so the final parameters for
SVM were: 𝐶 = 5 and kernel=𝑟𝑏𝑓 .
2. Naïve Bayes: No hyperparameter tuning required for Naïve Bayes classifier.
3. Random Forest: Grid search on number of decision trees to use and maximum
depth of trees with values: number of trees ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 80} and max depth of
trees ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 10}. We found that using 50 decision trees with max depth of
5 performed best without overfitting the real malware samples.
4. k-NN: Grid search on number of neighbors to consider, 𝑘, with values: 𝑘 ∈
{4, 5, . . . , 20}. 𝑘 = 8 worked well and the distance metric chosen was Euclidean.
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The classification results for each feature for each machine learning technique are
given below. We used 5-fold cross validation and the scores given are the average
scores from 5-fold cross validation. Table 7 gives the classification results for SVM.
Table 8 gives the classification results for Naïve Bayes. Table 9 gives the classification
results for Random Forest. Table 10 gives the classification results for k -NN.
Table 7: SVM-HMM scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99
Zbot 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.91
Renos 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
OnLineGame 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.99
Table 8: Naïve Bayes-HMM scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98
Zbot 0.79 0.80 0.73 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.72 0.77 0.63
Renos 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.78 0.82 0.72
OnLineGame 0.87 0.97 0.76 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.94
VBInject 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.90 1.00
Using Word2Vec features, SVM, Random Forest and k -NN classifiers were able
to differentiate between real and fake samples efficiently. However, Naïve Bayes
classifier had low recall rates for Zbot (73%) and OnLineGames (76%). We attribute
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Table 9: Random Forest-HMM scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
Zbot 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.95 0.88
Renos 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96
OnLineGame 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.91
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.89
Table 10: kNN-HMM scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98
Zbot 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.82 0.95 0.69
Renos 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.42
OnLineGame 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.36
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.59 1.00 0.19
this result to the ineffectiveness of the classifier rather than the quality of fake samples
because the other 3 algorithms were able to differentiate very well.
Using Bigram features, all 4 classifiers were able to differentiate between real and
fake samples very effectively with high precision and recall.
Using integer vectors, SVM and Random Forest precision and recall rates dipped
a little but they were still able to classify real and fake samples effectively. Naïve
Bayes and k -NN scores were quite low. As we have seen, Naïve Bayes is a weak
classifier as compared to the other 3 and we attribute these low scores to integer
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vectors being a weaker feature representation for the data. The low recall rates for
k -NN and Naïve Bayes means that a lot of real samples were classified as fake (high
false negative). On the other hand, the high precision rates for these 2 classifiers
means that very few fake samples were classified as real (low false positive).
5.2 GAN Results
We experimented with the stabilizing techniques mentioned in Section 4.3.1.
Although the training stabilized across all 5 families using these techniques, the
results improved for Zbot, Renos and VBInject but got worse for WinWebSec and
OnLineGames. This is a common phenomenon when training GANs. The loss values
for the discriminator and generator don’t necessarily indicate or correspond to the
model’s performance or quality of the generated samples. The discriminator and
generator loss for GAN for each family are given in Appendix B.
5.2.1 Best GAN Generative Model
We used a subset of the techniques for each family to get the best results in
generating fake samples. Minibatch discrimination was used for all 5 families. Label
smoothing and label switching were only used for Zbot, Renos and VBInject. The best
generative model was chosen for each family as discussed in Section 3.4.2. Table 11
summarizes the model chosen identified by the epoch number for each family.
Table 11: Best GAN generative model for each family







5.2.2 GAN Classification Results
Fake samples were generated using the chosen models in Table 11 in batches of
32 since that was the batch size during training. Generating samples in same batch
sizes as the training size generally gives better results.
We used the same hyperparameters as discussed in HMM results section (Sec-
tion 5.1.2) and tested the fake samples using all 3 features mentioned above. Table 12
gives the results for SVM model. Table 13 gives the results for Naïve Bayes model.
Table 14 gives the results for Random Forest model. Table 15 gives the results for
k -NN model.
Table 12: SVM-GAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.82 0.81
Zbot 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.83 0.91 0.77
Renos 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.82 0.94
OnLineGame 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.73 0.89 0.62
VBInject 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.75 0.79 0.72
Using Word2Vec and Bigram features, the scores for all 4 families dipped a little
as compared to the HMM results. SVM and Random Forest have accuracy, precision
and recall all above 90% for these 2 features, except for OnLineGames with 88%
precision with Random Forest. Low precision rate means high false positive rate which
is the most desirable result for us. Naïve Bayes has low overall scores for Word2Vec
and Bigram features on account of it being a weaker classifier. Interestingly, k -NN
has the lowest overall scores for these 2 features. This can be attributed to the way
k -NN algorithm works and that the generated data’s distribution is slightly closer to
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Table 13: Naïve Bayes-GAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.69 0.70 0.66
Zbot 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.70 0.71 0.65
Renos 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.98 0.75 0.73 0.73
OnLineGame 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.89 1.00 0.80 0.50 0.53 0.57
VBInject 0.95 0.91 1.00 0.84 0.93 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.72
Table 14: Random Forest-GAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.67 0.68 0.63
Zbot 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.86 0.91 0.80
Renos 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.92 0.93 0.92
OnLineGame 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.85 0.84 0.84
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.84
the real data’s distribution as compared to HMM fake samples.
For integer vectors, we see that all 4 classifiers were not able to differentiate
very well between real and fake samples. As seen with HMM, integer vectors are
a weaker feature representation but the difference in results between HMM integer
vector classification and GAN integer vector classification does suggest that the GAN
models were able to perform better than HMM. For k -NN and Renos, the precision
and recall are 0% which means that the model isn’t able to distinguish between fake
and real at all based on just the integer vectors.
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Table 15: kNN-GAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.88 0.90 0.79 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.61 0.80 0.24
Zbot 0.94 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.77 0.96 0.59
Renos 0.97 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.89 0.50 0.00 0.00
OnLineGame 0.94 1.00 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.65 0.83 0.40
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.82 0.92 0.64 1.00 0.28
5.3 WGAN Results
Unlike vanilla GAN, the loss values when training WGAN give reliable information
about the model’s progress and convergence. So for WGAN and WGAN with Gradient
Penalty we first discuss the loss curves and convergence and then give the classification
results for the 4 machine learning techniques.
5.3.1 Convergence and Loss Values
The loss values for all 5 WGAN models that we trained; 1 for each family; were
interesting. Figures 18 and 19 show the critic and generator loss curves respectively
for WinWeSec. Appendix B contains the loss curves for the rest of the 4 families.
The loss value for the critic and the generator converges very fast, in the first few
epochs and then stays same for the rest of the 100k epochs. We tried a lot of different
hyperparameters, such as changing the value of ‘‘n_critic’’, that is the number of
critic iterations per generator iteration, different clipping value and different learning
rates. Even changing the networks entirely and using Convolutional 1D instead of
fully connected Dense layers didn’t help. The value of loss didn’t change after the
first few epochs. This shows that clipping the weights is a major drawback in WGAN
(Section 2.4.3) as it saturates the model, and the weights don’t update after a point.
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Figure 18: WinWebSec WGAN critic loss.
Any change in weight is nullified by the clipping step. Interestingly, all 4 families
converge to the same loss value for the critic and generator. The clipping step stops
the training since the weights can’t change beyond the clipping range and don’t
respond to the gradient updates that are back propagated through the network.
5.3.2 WGAN Classification Results
The best generative model from WGANs was chosen for each family as discussed
in Section 3.4.2. Table 16 summarizes the best model chosen for each family. The
classification results for the fake samples generated by the selected WGAN models
are given below. We used the same hyperparameters as discussed in the HMM results
section (Section 5.1.2) and tested the fake samples using all 3 features in batches of
32. Table 17 gives the results for SVM model. Table 18 gives the results for Naïve
Bayes model. Table 19 gives the results for Random Forest model. Table 20 gives the
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Figure 19: WinWebSec WGAN generator loss.
results for k -NN model.
Table 16: Best WGAN generative model for each family.






Using Word2Vec and Bigram features SVM and Random Forest were able to
very effectively differentiate between real and fake samples generated by WGAN.
Interestingly, even Naïve Bayes and k -NN performed very well and we have seen from
previous results that they are the 2 weaker classifiers. This means that the WGAN
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Table 17: SVM-WGAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.94
Zbot 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.72
Renos 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97
OnLineGame 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.96
Table 18: Naïve Bayes-WGAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.91
Zbot 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.84 1.00 0.73
Renos 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.88
OnLineGame 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.93 1.00
VBInject 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.25
fake samples are of inferior quality compared to HMM and GAN.
Using integer vectors, the results for SVM and Random Forest were very high.
Again, integer vectors have proven to be weak feature representations that make
classification hard but in the case of WGAN even they are easily differentiable. For
k -NN and Naiïve Bayes with integer vectors, we see extremely low recall rates for
some families such as 25% for VBInject, 37% for OnLineGames and 53% for Renos.
But these low recall rates are accompanied by high precision rates, almost 100% across
the board for all families.
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Table 19: Random Forest-WGAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.96
Zbot 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.85
Renos 0.97 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.85
OnLineGame 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.93
VBInject 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.93
Table 20: kNN-WGAN scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
Zbot 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.81 1.00 0.65
Renos 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.75 1.00 0.53
OnLineGame 0.97 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.37
VBInject 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.25
5.4 Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty
As with WGAN, the critic’s loss value helps monitor the model’s performance for
WGAN with gradient penalties. The WGAN-GP paper mentions that the the critic’s
loss (negative of it) should start at a large number and then converge towards 0. The
generator’s loss is not very insightful and can fluctuate. So, first we discuss the loss
curves and then give the classification results.
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Figure 20: WinWebSec WGAN-GP critic loss.
5.4.1 Convergence and Loss Curves
The loss curves for all 5 families have a similar shape. Figures 20 and 21 show
the loss curves for WinWebSec critic and generator respectively. Appendix B contains
the loss curves for the rest of the 4 families.
We can see that the loss curve for the critic starts at around -28 and then slowly
converges to around -4. This is the expected behavior and means that our model
is training properly. Usually WGAN with Gradient Penalty take a long time to
train, around 200k-300k epochs. We trained till 100k epochs since we were training 5
different models, 1 for each family.
The critic loss curves for the other 4 families (Appendix B) also have similar
shapes but with slightly different values of convergence. Training the models for more
epochs, around 200k-300k would be ideal for full convergence.
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Figure 21: WinWebSec WGAN-GP generator loss.
The loss curve for the generator is not very informative about the model’s
performance and training and we can see that the loss values oscillate.
5.4.2 WGAN-GP Classification Results
The best generative model from WGAN-GPs was chosen for each family as
discussed in Section 3.4.2. Table 21 summarizes the best model chosen for each family.
The classification results for the fake samples generated by the selected WGAN-GP
models are given below. We used the same hyperparameters as discussed in the
HMM results section (Section 5.1.2) and tested the fake samples using all 3 features
in batches of 32. Table 22 gives the results for SVM model. Table 23 gives the results
for Naïve Bayes model. Table 24 gives the results for Random Forest model. Table 25
gives the results for k -NN model.
Using Word2Vec and Bigram features all 4 machine learning techniques weren’t
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Table 21: Best WGAN-GP generative model for each family.






Table 22: SVM-WGAN with Gradient Penalty scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.88 1.00 0.81 0.78 0.71 0.93 0.58 0.62 0.46
Zbot 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.89 1.00 0.79 0.69 0.71 0.64
Renos 0.88 1.00 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.41 0.38 0.42
OnLineGame 0.86 0.97 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.88 0.48 0.49 0.50
VBInject 0.81 0.89 0.76 0.84 0.77 .97 0.44 0.37 0.37
Table 23: Naïve Bayes-WGAN with Gradient Penalty scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.91 0.42 0.48 0.45
Zbot 0.79 0.89 0.73 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.35 0.35 0.34
Renos 0.81 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.34 0.37 0.47
OnLineGame 0.76 0.81 0.73 0.89 0.86 0.94 0.62 0.63 0.68
VBInject 0.83 0.90 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.44 0.47 0.53
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Table 24: Random Forest-WGAN with Gradient Penalty scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.86 0.79 0.72 0.73 0.72
Zbot 0.77 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.77
Renos 0.78 0.84 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.72 0.73 0.70
OnLineGame 0.81 0.87 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.63 0.63 0.73
VBInject 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.60 0.71 0.54
Table 25: kNN-WGAN with Gradient Penalty scores for each feature.
Malware Family
Features
Word2Vec Bigrams Integer Vectors
Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall Acc. Prec. Recall
WinWebSec 0.68 0.84 0.56 0.79 0.96 0.65 0.50 0.00 0.00
Zbot 0.79 0.97 0.64 0.82 0.91 0.78 0.55 0.60 0.9
Renos 0.86 1.00 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.71 0.57 0.53 0.18
OnLineGame 0.81 0.89 0.78 0.82 0.87 0.81 0.70 0.90 0.48
VBInject 0.86 1.00 0.74 0.77 0.97 0.61 0.49 0.27 0.10
able to give very good classification results. Compared to WGAN and GAN the
accuracy, precision and recall rates are much lower. This means that the quality
of fake samples generated by WGAN-GP generative models is better as compared
to WGAN and GAN. The most surprising result is the dip in Random Forest’s
classification. Random Forest is one of the better classifiers out of the 4 classifiers we
used. For Zbot, Renos and VBInject the accuracy for Random Forest is low ∼ 70%.
For WinWebSec and OnLineGames the accuracy is also low at 82% and 81% for
Word2Vec and even lower for Bigram at 81% and 74%. This is a promising result
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since we have seen that classifying real vs fake samples using these 2 features has been
very effective and we have gotten high accuracy and precision scores previously.
Using integer vector features the scores for SVM, Naïve Bayes and k -NN classifiers
are very low. Basically these 3 models are not able to distinguish between real and fake
samples just based on the integer representation. This is confirmed by accuracy scores
in range of 50%-60% and even lower for Naïve Bayes at less than 50% for WinWebSec,
Zbot, Renos and VBInject families. Random Forest did a better job as compared to
the other 3 techniques but still the accuracy is around 70% for WinWebSec, Zbot,
Renos and around 60% for OnLineGames and VBInject. This again shows that the
quality of fake samples generated by WGAN-GP generative model is much better
than the other GAN architectures and HMM.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we aimed at utilizing different generative modelling techniques to
generate fake malware mnemonic opcode sequences. We utilized 4 different techniques:
Hidden Markov Models, Generative Adversarial Networks, Wasserstein Generative
Adversarial Networks and Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Networks with Gradient
Penalty.
Previous work has shown that using malware as images, GANs can be utilized
successfully to generate fake malware images but there is a gap in the literature when
it comes to generating malware opcode sequences. Converting malware to images and
training GANs on images has an exceeded overhead as converting malware files to
images and training GANs on images is computationally expensive. Opcode sequences
provide a much simpler representation of the data.
We used 3 different feature extractions from malware opcode sequences:
Word2Vec, Bigram and Integer Vectors. Classification results showed that Word2Vec
and Bigram features give a very good representation of the malware data since for
all 4 generative models the classification results were very high when tested with
these 2 extracted features. Integer vectors, on the other hand are not a very good
representation since they don’t capture the true distribution of the real malware
samples. This is confirmed by the comparatively lower classification scores when
tested using integer vectors.
Fake samples generated by HMM were quite effectively distinguishable by SVM,
Random Forest and k -NN classifiers. Using Word2Vec and Bigram features these 3
classifiers had accuracy well above 90% for all 5 of the families. For integer vector
features, the accuracy was slightly lower. Naïve Bayes classifier, on the other hand
had much lower scores for all 3 features. This implies that Naïve Bayes is a weaker
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classifier comparatively for malware classification using opcode sequences.
Using generative models from GAN we saw an improvement in the results as it
was difficult for the classifiers to tell apart real and fake samples indicated by slightly
lower classification scores. For WGAN on the other hand, the results were worse
as compared to GAN. This is attributed to the weight clipping step in the WGAN
algorithm. Weight clippings inhibits the critic network’s ability to properly learn the
real data’s representation.
For WGAN with gradient penalty algorithm, we got the best results. We saw
that the classification results for Word2Vec and Bigram features were the worst as
compared to the other 3 generative models. For all 4 classifiers we got accuracy
around 70%-80% with Word2Vec and Bigram features. From previous results we
know that HMM, GAN and WGAN generative models were not able to properly
learn the true data’s distribution especially the Word2Vec and Bigram features. But
WGAN-GP clearly performed better. For integer vectors the results were even better
as the accuracy score dipped to 50%-60%. SVM classifier had accuracy of 41%, 48%
and 44% for Renos, OnlineGames and VBInject families.
So, we conclude that we can use WGAN with Gradient Penalty algorithm to
successfully generate fake malware opcode sequences such that they are close to the
real data’s distribution. This serves as a ‘‘proof of concept’’ that different GAN
algorithms can be successfully applied to generate malware opcode sequences and that
GANs are not succesful only for image data. The generative models can be used to
boost malware datasets for some families that have very few data samples. Moreover,
testing the quality of fake samples with Word2Vec and Bigram features is a better
option as compared to integer vectors.
60
6.1 Future Work
We have shown that we can utilize GAN algorithms to generate malware opcode
sequences. There are a lot of different directions that this research project can be
expanded to:
• We experimented with 5 malware families: WinWebSec, Renos, Zbot, On-
LineGames and VBInject. The dataset can be expanded and the experiments
can be done on more malware families.
• We trained individual GAN models for each family. We can experiment with
multi-class generative models.
• Trained generative models can be used to boost or augment the datasets for
families that have less data samples. Lack of large datasets sufficient for deep
neural networks is a common obstacle in malware research. Classifying malware
families using existing datasets and comparing the results after classifying
malware families with boosted datasets is a natural next step for this project.
This will give insights to the actual effectiveness and provide an important use
case for generated malware opcodes.
• Malware obfuscation is a pressing issue and the fake samples generated from
our WGAN-GP algorithm can be treated as obfuscated malware because of the
presence of noise in the generated opcode sequence. We can also add opcodes
from benign samples into the generated samples and then experiment with actual
obfuscated malware samples to boost the detection rate.
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APPENDIX A
ROC Curves and bar plots for optimum M.
Figure A.22: AUC scores for different M values for WinWebSec.
Figure A.23: AUC scores for different M values for Zbot.
66
Figure A.24: AUC scores for different M values for Renos.
Figure A.25: AUC scores for different M values for OnLineGames.
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Figure A.26: AUC scores for different M values for VBInject.
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Figure A.27: ROC curves for different M values for WinWebSec.
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Figure A.28: ROC curves for different M values for Zbot.
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Figure A.29: ROC curves for different M values for Renos.
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Figure A.30: ROC curves for different M values for OnLineGames.
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Figure A.31: ROC curves for different M values for VBInject.
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APPENDIX B
Loss curves for different GAN architectures.
B.1 GAN Loss Curves
The loss curves for all 5 families are given here. We can see that the loss values
don’t necessarily correspond to the generative model’s performance. For WinWebSec
and OnLineGames the training is unstable as we see the loss values oscillating. But
the results given in section 5.2 show that the results for all 5 families are almost the
same with sub par quality of fake samples.
Figure B.32: WWS GAN discriminator loss. Figure B.33: WWS GAN generator loss.
Figure B.34: Zbot GAN discriminator loss. Figure B.35: Zbot GAN generator loss.
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Figure B.36: Renos GAN discriminator loss. Figure B.37: Renos GAN generator loss.
Figure B.38: OLG GAN discriminator loss. Figure B.39: OLG GAN generator loss.
Figure B.40: VBInject GAN discriminator loss. Figure B.41: VBInject GAN generator loss.
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B.2 WGAN Loss Curves
Figure B.42: Zbot WGAN critic loss. Figure B.43: Zbot WGAN generator loss.
Figure B.44: Renos WGAN critic loss. Figure B.45: Renos WGAN generator loss.
Figure B.46: OLG WGAN critic loss. Figure B.47: OLG WGAN generator loss.
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Figure B.48: VBInject WGAN critic loss. Figure B.49: VBInject WGAN generator loss.
B.3 WGAN with Gradient Penalty Loss Curves
Figure B.50: Zbot WGAN-GP critic loss. Figure B.51: Zbot WGAN-GP generator loss.
Figure B.52: Renos WGAN-GP critic loss. Figure B.53: Renos WGAN-GP generator loss.
77
Figure B.54: OLG WGAN-GP critic loss. Figure B.55: OLG WGAN-GP generator loss.




Code snippets for Wasserstein distance and gradient penalty calculation are given
below.
C.1 Wasserstein Loss
Using -1 as ground truth labels for fake images and 1 as ground truth labels for
real images, the Wassersetin loss/distance is calculated as follows:
def wasserstein_distance(y_true , y_pred):
return tensorflow.keras.backend.mean(y_true * y_pred)
C.2 Gradient Penalty
The gradient penalty is implemented as follows:
import tensorflow.keras.backend as kb
def grad_penalty(y_true , y_pred , interpolated_samples):
’’’
L2 norm or Eucledian norm calculation:
1. Square the gradients
2. L2 norm = Sum over rows and take square root
3. Gradient penalty = lambda * (l2_norm - 1)^2
’’’
gradients = kb.gradients(y_pred , interpolated_samples)[0]
grad_squared = kb.square(gradients)
grad_norm = kb.sqrt(kb.sum(grad_squared , axis=np.arange(1, len(
grad_squared.shape))))
grad_penalty = kb.square(1 - grad_norm)
return kb.mean(grad_penalty)
We define lambda in the computational graph for the critic model when defining
the weights for each loss. For Wasserstein loss we assign a weight of 1 and for gradient
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penalty loss we assign a weight of 10 which is lambda. This is a hyperparameter and
we experimented with different values: {5, 8, 10, 12, 15}
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